Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1983

Elwood E. McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc. :
Brief of Defendant-Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Findley P. Gridley; Bruce B. Baird; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent;
Stephen G. Morgan; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., No. 18352 (Utah Supreme Court, 1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3053

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
)

ELWOOD K. McFARLAND,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent, )
)

vs.

Case No. 18352

)

SKAGGS , INC . ,

)

Defendant/Appellant.

)
)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, HONORABLE RONALD 0.
HYDE, DISTRICT JUDGE

Stephen G. Morgan
MORGAN, SCALLEY & DAVIS
261 East 300 South, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Findley P. Gridley
427 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Plaintiff /Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1

Nature of Case . . .
Disposit~on

In Lower Court .

1

Relief Sought on Appeal.

2

Statement of Facts . . .

2

The Court's Instructions

6

Law and Analysis . . . .

9

J

POINT I. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 12
CONSTITUTES REVERSABLE,PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN THAT IT INSTRUCTED AVONDET (SKAGGS) ARREST
OF McFARLAND FOR AN ASSAULT WAS UNLAWFUL.
SKAGGS HAD TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
(A CRIMINAL STANDARD IN A CIVIL TRIAL) THAT
McFARLAND WOULD BE FOUND GUILTY OF THE CRIME
OF ASSAULT IN A CRIMINAL COURT . . . . . . . .

9

POINT II. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 11
CONSTITUTED REVERSABLE, PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
THAT IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT AVONDET, AS
A PRIVATE CITIZEN, HAD NO PRIVILEGE TO ARREST
McFARLAND FOR ASSAULT ON HER PERSON BASED ON
PROBABLE CAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

POINT III. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE
STANDARD OF MALICE IN LAW LAID DOWN IN THE
TERRY DECISION AND ADOPT MALICE IN FACT
INSTEAD OF MALICE IN LAW . . . . . . .

26

Con cl us ion . .

. . . . . .

31

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225,
Thirteen Lawyers Edition 2nd, 142, 1964 .................
Bettolo vs. Safeway Stores, 54 P.2d 24 (1954) ..............
Cervantez vs. J.C. Penneys, 595 F.2d 975 (1975) .............
Chavis vs. Henderson, 488, F.Supp. 325 (NY 1980) .............
Collyer vs. S.H. Kress & Company, 54 P.2d 20 (1936) ..........
Fanier vs. Chesapeake and Potamac Telephone Co. of
Maryland, 404 A.2d 147, 153 (District of Columbia,
1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gomez vs. Garcis, 169 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1980) ..................
Lazarus vs. Pascuzzi, 333 N.E. 2d 1079 (Ill. 1979) ...........
Orient Insurance Company vs. Cox, 238 S.W.2d 757 (Ark. 1951).
Sively vs. American National Insurance, 454 S.W. 2d
799, 454 S.W. 2d at 802 (Tex. 1970) .......................
Terry vs. Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314 (Unah, 1979) ................

19
25
24
18
20,21,24,
25
22
17
13,14
15
14
27,31,33

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-603, 1953, as amended ............. 8
Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-604, 1953, as amended ............. 8
Utah Code Annotated, §77-13-4, 1953, as amended .............. 8,16,19,
26,32
Utah Code Annotated, §78-11-17, 1953 as amended .............. 8
Utah Code Annotated, §78-11-18, 1953 as amended .............. 8
Utah Code Annotated, §78-17-7, 1953, as amended .............. 7
Utah Code Annotated, §78-17-18, 1953, as amended ............. 7
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
4 7 ALR 3d , 1 0 05 - 1 0 0 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12 4 ALR 13 78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . · · · · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 , 13
12 4 ALR 13 8 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . · · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12 4 ALR 13 8 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 13
13 7 ALR 5 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · . . . . . . . . . 2 0

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

Other Authorities Cited Continued
Page
6 Am Jur 2d Assault and Battery Section 207 ................ . 12
30 Am Jur 2d on Evidence, Section 1169 ..................... . 10,11
Ronald Boyce, "A Thumbnail Sketch of the Utah Supreme
Court Decisions, 1979-1980".(Utah.Bar Journal) .......... . 27
Illinois Annotated Statutes, C.F. 38 Sections 107-3 ........ . 19 .
W. Prosser, Law of Torts, p. 44 (4th Edition, 1971) ........ . 30
Restatement of Torts 2d, Sections 63-68 .................... . 22,23
Restatement of Torts 2d, Section 119 ....................... . 19
Restatement of Torts , Section 141 ......... ·.............. ·... . 23
Utah Law Review, 1980,>Volume 3, "Developments in Utah Law,
page 698 ................................................ . 27

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
)

ELWOOD K. McFARLAND,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent.)
)

vs.

Case No. 18352

)

SKAGGS , INC . ,

)

Defendant/Appellant. )
)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves an action for false arrest where the
Plaintiff, Elwood K. McFarland, was initially approached by a Skaggs
employee in connection with an investigation of alleged shoplifting
but based upon an alleged altercation between Plaintiff and the
Skaggs employee, Plaintiff was subsequently arrested for an assault.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial was heard on January 11 and 12, 1982, in the District
Court of the Second Judicial District in and for Weber County, State
of Utah before a jury with the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge presiding.

Based on the Court's instructions, the jury determined that

the arrest by the Skaggs employee was not lawful and awarded the
Plaintiff $10,000.00 in general damages and $25,000.00 in punitive
damages.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant/Appellant Skaggs contends that the Court's instructions (1) requiring that in order for Skaggs to satisfy its burden
of proof on its affirmative defense of justification for detention
by reason of an arrest for assault it had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (a criminal standard in a civil trial) that McFarland
would be found guilty of the crime of assault in a criminal court,
and (2) advising the jury that in Utah there is no statutory privilege protecting against an unlawful arrest for assault based on
one having probable cause to believe that an assault had been
committed, were improper and constituted reversable, prejudicial
error making it impossible for Skaggs to get a fair trial and based
thereon, Skaggs seeks to have the lower Court's judgment reversed
and the cause remanded back to the lower Court for a new trial
with proper instructions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 9th day of January, 1980, Elwood McFarland, a dentist

and a resident of Ogden, Utah, entered the Ogden Skaggs Drug Center
located at 24th Street and Monroe Blvd. to purchase a t.v. antenna
plug.

(Record pg. 6)

The Plaintiff, after entering the store, pro·

ceeded to the display stand where the desired electrical antenna
plugs were located.
electrical plugs.

McFarland fingered through the display of the
Apparently being unable to find the particular

plug, be began to search in nearby areas in which an electrical plug
might have been misplaced under an affiliated heading.
11)

(Record pg.

After finishing a check of possible locations of the wanted

article, Plaintiff became satisfied that the particular antenna
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plug he wanted was not in stock.

Plaintiff then proceeded to leave

the store.
What the Plaintiff did not know was that during the time he
had been perusing through the merchandise at the display stands,
he had been watched by Anita Avondet, a Skaggs Security Officer.
(Record p. 93)

Avondet testified that she saw the Plaintiff take

an electrical part off the shelf, and put it in his right hand
trenchcoat pocket.

(Record p. 93)

Avondet had been standing on a

catwalk, behind a one way mirror observing the customer traffic
on the electrical aisle.

(Record p. 110)

Immediately after passing through the door leaving Skaggs,
the Plaintiff was approached by Anita Avondet.

According to

McFarland, Avondet stopped McFarland with the words:
like to talk to you".

"Sir , I'd

(Record p. 14, 42) or "Sir, I want to talk

to you." (Record p. 16)

According to Avondet, she stopped McFarland

with the words: "Sir, I'm with Skaggs Security.

I need to have

you come back into the store with me." (Record pg. 95, 98) According to McFarland, he thought she was selling something (Record
p . 14, 42) and so.· he said "I'm not interested" (Record p. 14) or
"I don't want to" (Record p. 16) and "I was moving her away so I
could go to my car." (Record p. 14) or "I moved her away in an
attempt to walk around her to my automobile." (Record p. 16)

On

cross examination, McFarland was asked: "Your reaction then to her
statement "Sir, I'd like to talk to you" was simply to take your
left arm and push her out of the way as you proceeded past her."
McFarland responded:
walk around her . .

~

"Yes, I extended my arm and was trying to
. Q.

Was that in the area of the chest?
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A. Yes."

(Record p. 43)

According to Avondet, McFarland struck

her across the chest, pushing her, causing her to lose her
balance, and she fell down against a rail.

Avondet promptly

got back up on her feet only to be struck again by McFarland.

At

this point, Avondet reached for her handcuffs and McFarland reportedly declared "O. K. , 0. K. , I' 11 go back in."

(Record p. 95)

Avondet testified that during this experience she was always in
fear of immediate bodily harm and that she had been struck by
McFarland once by his left hand and once by his right hand.

(Record

p. 96)

In light of the altercation, Avondet escorted McFarland into
the managers office for further questioning.

(Record p. 96)

When

they reached the manager's office she requested that McFarland
hand over his trenchcoat so that it could be examined so as to
ascertain whether it contained the electrical part she had observed him put in his right hand trenchcoat pocket.

McFarland

repled to Avondet that he was not about to hand over anything until he was placed under arrest.

At this point Avondet said "O.K.,

I'm placing you under citizen's arrest for assault".

(Record p. 98)

Avondet testified that at that time McFarland removed his trenchcoat and handed it to her.

She examined this right hand pocket,

the pocket into which she had seen McFarland place the part.

Exam-

ination revealed the electrical part was not to be found in that
pocket.

She did not examine the left pocket because her observa-

tion was that he put in in the right pocket.

(Record p. 98)

this juncture, Avondet called the police.
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At

When the police arrived, McFarland was questioned about the
alleged assualt on Avondet, and according to officer Lucas of the
Ogden City Police Department, McFarland told him that "he had pushed
her".

(Record p. 70)

Officer Lucas stated that Avondet told him

that "she saw him pick up the t.v. plug and put in in his right
coat pocket.

He then walked past the check out stand and out the

store without paying for it . . . . She left the catwalk and went
·out side the store and approached Mr. McFarland and asked to talk
to him, at which time he turned around and hit her.

He took his

right arm and struck her just below the neck, pushing her away."
(Record p. 57)

Officer Lucas testified Avondet told him "she

feared for her safety" . . . "like anybody that gets hit, she was
scared, she got hit."

(Record p. 83)

was "in fear of bodily harm."

Avondet also testified she

(Record p. 97)

Officer Lucas also

testified that "from my investigation, myself personally, I felt
an assault had been committed."

(Record p. 69)

McFarland told

Officer Lucas that he thought Avondet was "a prostitute".
p. 50)

(Record

According to Avondet, McFarland also told Lucas that

"The only reason I struck her was because I thought she was a
'hooker'."

and "If I'd really wanted the merchandise there would

have been nothing she could have done to have stopped me."

(Record

(Record p. 100)
After discussing the matter with both McFarland and Avondet,
Officer Lucas asked Avondet to accompany him outside the manager's
office to the hall.

There, Officer Lucas and Avondet had the

following conversation:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lucas:
Avondet:
Lucas:

"Are you really hurt?"
"Oh not that bad. Just you know
I've been hit and I'm not bleeding or cut or anything."
"Well its up to you. We have a
good assault case. It's up to
you . "
(Record p. 59, 100)

Because she wasn't hurt, Avondet decided not to have McFarland
formally arrested for assault and because the merchandise Avondet
had been McFarland place in his pocket was missing, it was decided
that McFarland should simply be released.

McFarland was informed

promptly of his decision and he was told he was free to go.
p. 100)

(Record

McFarland advised his wife of the incident and no other

persons were aware of said incident until such time as McFarland
filed his Complaint against Skaggs

in

late November, 1980,

allegin~

false arrest and slander on the part of Skaggs and suing for $5, 000.~~
in general damages and $50,000.00 in punitive damages, after which
an article appeared in the OGDEN STANDARD EXAMINER reporting that
McFarland had filed his civil suit and gave a brief description of
the substance of the law suit.
THE COURTS INSTRUCTIONS
At trial, Skaggs argued that Avondet was justified in detain·
ing and s,earching McFarland for two reasons; to-wit, (1) the

privile~t

granted storeowners to detain and search suspected shoplifters and

(2) the privilege granted to private persons to arrest and detain
persons who have committed an assault of their person.

The period

of detention for each of the foregoing two reasons overlapped each
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other and thus if Skaggs lawfully detained McFarland for either of
the two reasons, the detention was justified and Skaggs is not liable
to McFarland for false arrest.
With regard to the first reason, (the merchant privilege
arrest), Utah law provides as follows:

"78-17-7
Shoplifting - Authority to Search.
Any merchant may request an individual on his
premises to place or keep in full view any
merchandise such individual may have removed,
or which the merchant has reason to believe
he may have removed, from its place of display
or elsewhere, whether for examination, purchase, or for any othe~· reasonable purpose.
No merchant shall be criminally or civilly
liable on account of having make such a request."
"78-11-18 Shoplifting - Authority to Detain.
Any merchant who has reason to believe that
merchandise has been wrongfully taken by an
individual and that he can recover such
merchandise by taking such individual into
custody and detaining him may, for the purpose
of attempting to effect such recovery or for
the purpose of informing a peace officer of
the circumstances of such detention, take the
individual into custody and detain him, on the
premises, in a reasonable manner and for a
reasonable length of time. Such taking into
custody and detention by a merchant or his
employee shall not render such merchant or his
employee criminally or civilly liable for false
arrest, false imprisonment, slander or unlawful
detention or for any other type of claim of action
.unless such taking into custody and detention are
unreasonable under all the circumstances."
Skaggs requested that the Court instruct the jury on the above
law in its Requested Instructions No. 5 and No. 6, but the Court refused to do so.

Instead the Court only gave Skaggs Requested Instruc-

tion No. 11 (the Court's Instruction No. 7) which was a summary
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of Utah law as set forth in 76-6-603 and 604, which the Court felt
also covered the law as set forth in 78-11-17 and 18.
reading

However, a

of these statutes clearly show that the requirements are

different.

For example 78-11-17 does not require a reasonable

belief of the merchant to search a suspected shoplifter whereas
78-11-18 and 76-6-603 and 604 all require that the merchant have
probable cause to detain a suspected shoplifter.
With regard to the second reason (private citizen's privilege to arrest), Utah law provides as follows:
"77-13-4. By private persons - A private
person may arrest another
(1) For a public offense committed or
attempted in his presence."
Since an assault constitutes a "public offense" a private
person has a privilege to arrest another person based on probable
cause when said other person has committed an assault on the private
person.

Nevertheless, the Court in its Instruction No. 11 instructed

the jury as follows:
"There is no statutory privilege protecting
against an unlawful arrest for assault based
on one having probable cause to believe an
assault had been committed."
In addition to the above, the Court in its Instruction No.
12 instructed the jury as follows:
"A charge that Plaintiff Elwood McFarland, M.D. connnitted the crime of assault
requires you to consider this issue under
the rules applicable to the criminal action.
A Defendant in a criminal action is presumed
to be innocent until the contrary is proved,
and in the case of reasonable doubt whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown he is

-8-
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entitled to a verdict of 'not guilty'.
This presumption places upon the person
alleging the commission of a crime the
burden of proving the Defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt." (This is the
first paragraph. The second paragraph defines reasonable doubt).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
POINT I
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 12 CONSTITUTED REVERSABLE
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN THAT IT INSTRUCTED AVONDET (SKAGGS)
ARREST OF McFARLAND FOR AN ASSAULT WAS UNLAWFUL. SKAGGS
HAD TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (A CRIMINAL
STANDARD IN A CIVIL TRIAL) THAT McFARLAND WOULD BE
FOUND GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ASSAULT IN A CRIMINAL COURT.
The Court's Instruction No. 12 requiring the jury to "consider
this issue under the rules applicable to a criminal action" would
undeniably give any reasonable person

acting as a juror a sense

that he or she were passing judgment upon the Plaintiff for the crime
of assault - guilty or not guilty.

The logical outgrowth of this

instruction in the trial was that if the Defendant,

Skaggs, did

not carry its burden of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" of the
Plaintiff 1 s criminal guilt, then the Defendant was liable for false
arrest.
The

Court~s

Instruction No. 11 clearly outlined the con-

sequences to Skaggs if it failed to carry this misapplied burden.
"You are instructed that if the Plaintiff
committed an assault on Anita Avondet and she
had the right to arrest the Plaintiff and to
detain him for the purposes of surrendering
him to the custody of a peace officer.
However, if an assault had not been
committed, then she had no right to arrest
Plaintiff. There is no statutory privilege
protecting against an unlawful arrest for
assault based on one having probable cause
to believe an assault had been committed."
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The Court's Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 gave Plaintiff's
counsel the green light to argue to the jury as follows:
"Now just two things to make sure we really
understand what we're doing, and as far as burden of proof is concerned, again going back to
these instructions. It's the burden, the
absolute and total and compie~e burden of the
Defendant, that is Skaggs, to prove to you people
beyond a reasonable doubt, a criminal standard,
that an assault as defined in the Utah State
Statute, was committed . . . It is the burden
of Skaggs to prove criminally that Dr. McFarland
assaulted Ms. Avondet. I would suggest to you
that they have not carried that burden. Failing
to do it, the jury would have to conclude that
you have a false arrest for assault. It's as
simple as that. They, failing their burden,
they lose. Damages must be assessed." (Record
p. 258, 259)
The Court allowed the Plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance
whereas the Court required the Defendant Skaggs to prove its case
"beyond a reasonable doubt''.

The Court was clearly in error and

prevented Skaggs from having a fair trial.
In 30 Am Jur 2d on Evidence, Section 1169, it states in
pertinent part as follows:
"It is well settled in substantially all the
jurisdictions in the United States, or at least
in all those in which the question has been
directly raised, that facts constituting a crime
need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt if
they are at issue in a civil action, but that
it is sufficient to prove the existence of the
criminal act by preponderance of the evidence.
Thus, altho~gh fact~ may be alleged that, if
true, constitute guilt in the party charged,
~or which he might be indicted and punished,
it does not follow that the proof, in order to
maintain the cause of action or defense, must
be sue~ as ~ould conv~ct the party charged of
the crime, if upon trial under an indictment.
TJ;us, in a civil action where there is an allegation of fraud or forgery, or a criminal misappropriation of property, or false representations, or a trespass which might subject the
trespassers to criminal prosecution._ p~oof be-10-
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yond a reasonable doubt is not required,
and it is generally held that a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. In a civil
action for assault and battery, the fact that
the act forming the basis of the action is also
a crime does not require the Plaintiff to sustain the allegations of his Complaint by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (the same
would apply to an affirmative defense) Although some cases, in defining the degree of
proof essential to establish in a civil
action facts which constitute a crime, have
used expressions which seem to require more
than a mere preponderance of the evidence, they
are apparently not intended to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
While, in a civil case, a presumption exists
that the party to whom a criminal act is imputed
is innocent, such presumption may be overcome
by a preponderance of the evidence. However, it
has been said that this presumption should
yield only to satisfactory evidence, which would
unavoidably require clearer proof than would be
necessary in a case involving no criminality.
For example, according to some authorities, to
create a preponderance of evidence in favor of
a defense of alteration of an instrument, the
presumption of innocence must be overcome, and
therefore, the proof should be clear and convincing.
In some of the earlier cases it was held that
a criminal act which is directl in issue in a
civi case must e esta is e
eton a reasonable doubt. But these cases areor the most
part no longer authoritative, and in some instances have been ex ressl overruled." 30 Am. Jr.
Evi ence Section 1 9. (Emp asis added and
language in brackets added)
In light of the lack of legal basis for using a criminal burden in
a civil trial, one might point out that it would obviously be reversable, prejudicial error if in a criminal case the prosecution were
allowed to prove the guilt of the accused by a preponderance of the
evidence.

The law is consistent in its burden in criminal actions;

-11-
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that consistency is not less important in civil actions.

In

particular, when the case involves a question of assault, as in
the case at bar, the degree of proof required in 6 Am. Jr. 2d
Assault and Battery Section 207, is as follows:
"The basic doctrine which authorizes issues
of fact to be determined in accordance with the
preponderance or weight of the evidence applies
to civil actions to recover damages for assault
and battery and to affirmative defenses therein.
The fact that the act formin the basis of the
so a crimina act oes not re uire

Prejudicial error was made when the Court imposed upon the
Defendant the burden of criminal proof for the elements of the
crime of assault in this case.

The elements of the crime of assault

were only tangentially at issue.

If it had been a case where Anita

Avondet was trying to recover money damages from McFarland for
assault, then the elements of the crime of assault would have been
directly in issue, but as we have seen, even then Avondet would not
have had to prove them "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Proof "beyond a reasonable doubt•' as a standard in civil
cases is not one which appears to have any foundation in modern
jurisprudence.

The history of criminal standards in civil trials

is well laid out in 124 ALR 1378 in an annotation entitled "Reasonable Doubt Rule As Applicable To Evidence In Civil Cases Of Facts
Amounting To A Felony Or Misdemeanor.", where the annotator summarizes the rule in the United States by stating:
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"It seems to be well settled in substantially
all the jurisdictions in this country or at
least in all those in which the question has
been directly raised, that facts constitutin~
a crime need not be raven be and a reasonab e
ou t i t ey
action.
124 ALR 1380.
In support of the above proposition, the annotator cites court
authority in 34 different states, as well as the Federal Courts,
for this wide and well founded law.

The article also cites case

law which provides an interesting analogy to the instant case.
for instance a case around the turn of the century

stated that in

order to make
"Good a defense of justification on the
ground of truth in an action for slander
in charging a crime, the Defendant [was]
required to prove the Plaintiff guilty of
the crime imported to him [by the Defendant]
by testimony sufficient to convict the
Plaintiff of those charges on a criminal trial."
However, regarding this proposition the annotation states the
general rule as follows:
"But this view, so far as it was adopted,
has since been overruled expressly or by
implication. (cites omitted) An instruction
in an action for libel that if a crime is
charged against the Plaintiff by the publication in question, then the Defendant, in order
to show the truth of the charge, must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Plaintiff
committed the crime, was declared to be unsound,
as a preponderance of evidence is sufficient."
124 ALR 1385.
These vintage cases, declaring the burden to be only a
preponderance of the evidence even though the elements of a crime
are at issue in a civil case, are still good law across the United
States~

In Lazarus vs. Pascuzzi, 333 N.E. 2d 1079 (Ill. 1979),

which involved the sale of a boat without the consent of the owner,
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the trial court applied a reasonable doubt standard of proof for
a criminal act in a civil action.

The reviewing court granted

a new trial stating as follows:
"The Court clearly s~ated that proof of
criminal activity requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. This is not true in a civil
case when a violation of law is relied on. In
a civil action, the violation like ever oth&
act at issue need on
be rove
a re'-pon erance o the evidence.
cites omitted
Because it affirmatively appears on the record
that the trial court may have applied the wrong
standard of proof to the agents at issue and did
in fact apply the incorrect standard to the
proof of the criminal act, we must reverse and
remand for a new trial. Since the existence of
agency in the possible criminal acts are issues
of fact, the resolution of which depends largely
upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, only a new trial applying
the correct preponderance of the evidence standard
to the evidence can correct the possible error at
trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court . . . is reversed and the cause is remanded
for a new trial." 333 N.E. 2d 1080
Sively vs. American National Insurance, 454 S.W. 2d 799,
454 S.W. 2d at 802 (Tex. 1970), the court held as follows:
"Plaintiff further urges that the Defendant
must prove the decreased was intoxicated beyond
a reasonable doubt as in any criminal case. We
find no Texas case directly in point, but in
124 ALR 1380, we f~nd this snatement: 'It seems
to be well settled in substantially all the
jurisdictions in this country, or at least in
all those in which the question has been directly
raised, that facts constituting a crime need not
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt if they are
at issue in a civil case.' Therefore, we will
follow the majority and hold that the facts constituting intoxication need be proven by a preponderance of the evidence as in all civil suits."
454 S.W. 2d at 802.

-14-
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Furthermore, in Orient_ Insurance Company vs. Cox, 238
S~W.2d

757 (Ark, 1951), an insurance case concerning a fire in which

the crime of arson was at issue, the court stated as follows:
"Appellants made numerous specific objections
to the giving of Instruction No. 7. It is argued
that the instruction is abstract, misleading and
prejudicial in that it employed language which is
only applicable in criminal cases and invaded the
province of the jury by cormnenting on the weight
of the evidence. The well settled rule in this
in civil cases is that facts constitutin

_ i e nstruction No.
ec are t at on y a
preponderance of the evidence was required,
there are other cases where circumstantial
evidence and the presumption of innocence are
involved and proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is required. This language was misleading in
that it in fact had the effect of requiring
more than a preponderance of the evidence to
establish incendiarism." (Emphasis added)
238 S.W. 2d at 763.
The court concluded its opinion by the following sentence:

"On account of errors indicated in the
giving of instructions 7 and 9 requested by
Appellee, the Judgment is reversed and the
cause remanded for a new trial." Id. at
764.
Based on the above law, it.is absolutely clear that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is not the standard or burden in a civil
trial and the trial court committed reversable and prejudicial
error in so instructing the jury which made it impossible for Skaggs
to get a fair trial, such that Skaggs is entitled to a new trial
with proper instructions.
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POINT II
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 11 CONSTITUTED REVERSABLE,
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN THAT IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT
AVONDET, AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN, HAD NO PRIVILEGE TO
ARREST McFARLAND FOR ASSAULT ON HER PERSON BASED ON
PROBABLE CAUSE.
The court's Instruction No. 11 stated as follows:
"You are instructed that if plaintiff
committed an assault on Anita Avondet, then
she had a right to arrest the plaintiff and to
detain him for purposes of surrendering him to
the custody of a peace officer."
(This paragraph was requested by the Defendant Skaggs).
"However, if an assault had not been committed
then she had no right to arrest plaintiff. There
is no statutory privilege protecting against an
unlawful arrest for assault based on one having
probable cause to believe an assault had been
committed."
The above instruction gave plaintiff's counsel the green
light to argue to the jury as follows:
"You and I go out and arrest one of our
neighbors for what we consider to be improper
activity. After you make the arrest you better
make the arrest stick or you've got problems.
You better be right or you've got a problem.
And that's why the judge has told you here
that she doesn't have any privilege, and unless
Miss Avondet can prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Dr. McFarland assaulted her, then
she collllilitted false arrest, and Ska s Dru
tore or out et is res onsi
Notwithstanding the court's Instruction No. 11, however, the
Utah law allows a private person to arrest another for a public
offense committed or attempted in his presence, based on probable
cause.

Section 77-13-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

states as follows:

-16-
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"A private person may arrest another
for a public offense committed or attempted
in his presence."
A fair reading of the above statute, would lead any private citizen
to believe that he had a right to arrest another for what he reasonably believed to be an assault committed in his presence and on
his person and that probable cause would be valid defense to a
charge of false arrest.

To conclude otherwise, would mean that

a private citizen would have to read something into the statute
that is not there, to wit:

that if the person arrested is not

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense for which he was
arrested, then the private citizen is liable for a false arrest.
That simply is not the law in Utah nor can one conclude that from
reading the statute.
While the language of the statute itself does not use the
words "probable cause to believe", other states with similar statutes
have read such words into the statute in order for it to make sense.
For example, California's statute Penal Code 837, is almost identical
and in the 1980 California case of Gomez v. Garcia, 169 Cal. Rptr.
350 (1980), the Court of Appeals held as follows:
"Penal Code Section 837 authorizes a rrivate
erson to arrest another for a ublic of ense
committe in his presence.
Simi ar to the Utah
statute 77-13-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended) While the statute does not speak of
'probable cause to believe' an offense has been
committed in the present of the person making the
arrest, (same as Utah) the state of mind of such
erson of necessit comes into la in a hind si ht
ana ysis of whether t e arrest was or was not
ful.
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The phrase 'in the presence' is concerned
with the conduct of the arrestee which forms
the basis for the arrest. In other words, bad
conduct must have been in the presence of the
person making the arrest. Where the validity
of the arrest turns on whether that conduct
constitutes a public offense, the test to be

aKElied must be one of whether the person making
t e arrest had a reasonable, ood faith belief
t at it
. 1
Cal. Reptr. at
(Emphasis added)

The facts of this California case are interesting as they pertain
to the defense of ones own self or ones own property.

The case

involved a disgruntled exemployee (Gomez) who returned to his old
place of employment.

He was asked to leave, he refused.

He was

arrested by his employer for breach of the peace and the police were
called.

Gomez was acquitted of the misdemeanor charge of breach of

the peace.

Gomez then promptly brought suit for false arrest and

false imprisonment.

The court found that his employer was acting

on probable cause that he had committed the crime.

It must be noted

that the employer was protecting his own property as it was his
own place of business, and on that basis, even though Gomez was
acquitted of the charge for which he was arrested, recovery was
denied.

Probable~

cause was present.

It is quite certain the re-

sult would have been the same if the employer had done the arresting
in protection of his own person but it is likely quite certain the
result would not have been the same had the employer done the
arresting in protection of another's property or person.
In another 1980 case, Chavis vs. Henderson, 488, F.Supp.
325 (_NY 1980), the Court stated "to support an arrest by a police
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officer or civilian there must be reasonably trustworthy information
known to the arresting individual sufficient to warrant a prudent
man in believing that the petitioner connnitted or was committing
an offense.''

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225,

Thirteen Lawyers Edition 2nd, 142, 1964.
In a 1971 Utah Law Review Article, the author in a footnote
likens an Illinois statute concerning the arrest power of a private
citizen to a Utah statute.

The notes states:

"The arrest power of a private citizen in
Illinois is similar to that in most other
jurisdictions. The Illinois statute authorizes a citizen arrest where there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense other
than an ordinance violation is being committed.
Illinois Annotated Statutes, C.G. 38 Sections
107-3. (Emphasis added)(Vol. 4 U.L.R., 486, 487, fn.9)
In Utah, the statute is even more liberal in that a citizen may
arrest where inter alia, "any public offense is counnited in his
presence."

Utah Code Annotated 77-13-4.

The all important point,

however, is that said arrest need be based only on probable cause.
It is submitted that the Court mistakenly based its inclusion of the second paragraph of Instruction No. 11 on the
Restatement of Torts, 2d, Section 119, which was provided to the
Court and argued by the Plaintiff's counsel, which states as follows:

"A private person is privileged to arrest
another without a warrant for a criminal
offense . . . (c) if the other, in the presence
of the actor, is committing a breach of the
peace. .
"
Under the comment on clause (c) and (d) the Restatement states as
follows/ in covering situations where the breach of the peace in-
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valves the property or person of someone other than the person
making the arrest, which is an all important distinction in understanding the law in this area:
"o. Reasonable suspicion. To create the
privilege to arrest another, it is not enough
that the actor-whether a private person or a
peace officer-reasonably suspects that the other
is committing a breach of the peace, except as
stated in Clause (e), and in Section 12l(c),
where the actor is a peace officer and he arrests
a participant in an affray. If in fact no breach
of the peace has been committed, a mistaken
belief on the part of the actor, whether induced
by a mistake of law or of fact and however reasonable, that a breach of the peace has been connnitted
by the other does not confer a privilege to arrest
under Clause (c).
Illustration:
4. A, a private person, sees B and C
fighting. Reasonably believing it to be a
mutual combat, A arrests both B and C. In fact
B was acting in self-defense. A's arrest of
B is not privileged under the rule states in
Section 12l(c)."
This Restatement section is inapplicable in the case at
bar because the case at bar involves a breach of the peace on the
person making the arrest, not a third person as set forth in the
Restatement Illustration.
The landmark California case of Collyer vs. S.H. Kress &
Company, 54 P.2d 20

(1936) makes the distinction between Section

119 of the Restatement (which involves the person or property of one
other than the person making the arrest) and the case at bar (which
involves only the person making the arrest).

In 137 ALR 501, the

annotator approves the distinction recognized in the Collyer case

-20-
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and then quotes directly from the Collyer case as follows:
"We, therefore, approve the distinctions
made in Collyer v. Kress· & Company, . . .
That broad statement occasionally appears
to the effect that probable cause is no
defense in actions for false imprisonment.
. . . In all cases involving solely the
legality of the process, it is obvious that
probable cause is not pertinent to any ·issue
in the case. Because of like irrelevancy, the
statement may properly be made in cases of
illegal arrests upon suspicion by a private
person where, by statutory authority or otherwise, he is permitted to make such an arrest
only when the offense is being connnitted in
his presence. However, those authorities which
hold where a person has reasonable grounds to
believe that another is stealing his property,
as distin uished from those where the offense has
been comp ete , that he is justifie in detaining
the suspect for a reasonable length of time for
the purpose of investigation in a reasonable
manner [citing cases], must necessarily proceed
upon the theory that probable cause is a defense.
And this is the law because the right to protect
one's ro ert from in·ur has intervened. In an
e fort to harmonize the individual right to liberty
with a reasonable protection to the person or
property of the Defendant, it should be said in
such a charge of false imprisonment, where a
defendant had robable cause to believe that
laintiff was about -to in·ure defendant in
woul constitute but a misdemeanor, that proba le
cause is a defense, rovided, of course, that the
etention was reasonable. As already indicated,
the rule should be different if the offense believed
to be in the process of commission relates to the
person or property of another." (Emphasis added)
The opinion is clear that "if the offense believed to be
in process of commission relates to the person or property of
another" probable cause is not enough to confer the privilege to
arrest.

This statement is consistent with the aforementioned

Restatement Illustration where the arrestor (A) arrested (B) and
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(:C) for an offense ''believed to be in the process of connnission
which relate[d] to the person or property of another."

On the

other hand, the opinion is also clear that"probable cause is a
defense'' if it exists in a circumstance where a defendant had
probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was about to injure
the defendant in his person or property."

Id. at 502 (emphasis

added).
Thus, defense of ones own self, or defense of ones own
property involves a completely different area of the law than
the defense of another or

d~fense

of another's property.

This

distinction of protecting ones own person and property by private
citizen arrest on the basis of probable cause is noted in the
recent 1979 District of Columbia case of Fanier vs. Chesapeake and
Potamac Telephone Co. of Maryland, 404 A.2d 147, 153 (District of
Columbia, 1979) where the court held as follows:
"In this jurisdiction probable cause becomes material where defendant arrests or detains laintiff without a warrant or where
e c aims to e actin in a rotection o
is
eerson or property. Lia ility wi
not be
imposed in those circumstances if there are
reasonable grounds to justify the detention,
and the detention is accomplished in a reasonable manner." (Emphasis added)
The R"estatement of Torts 2nd also Eecognized this all important distinction in Sections 63-68.

In Section 67, the follow-

ing is stated:
"Section 67. Assault or Im~risonment in
Self-Defense. The actor is privileged in-
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tentionally to confine another or to put
him in apprehension of a harmful or of fensive contact for the ur ose of reventin
him from inflicting a
contact or other bodil harm u on the actor,
un er t e same con itions w ich create a
privilege to inflict a harmful or offense
contact or other bodily harm upon the other
for the same purpose.'' (Emphasis added)
Under the Comment, it is stated as follows:
"The actor is privileged to impose such a
confinement or put the other in such an
apprehension of a bodily contact if, but
only if, the conditions stated in Section
65 or 66 are satisfied."
The conditions of Sections 65 and 66 are that if the actor
has a reasonable belief a harmful or offensive contact is about
to be perpetrated upon him, he is extended the privilege under the
terms of 67.
The Restatement of Torts, Section 141, entitled Afray or
a Similar Breach of the Peace, also states:
"Either a peace officer or a private person
is privileged to use force against another or
to impose confinement upon him for the purpose
of terminating or preventing the renewal of an
afray or an equally serious breach of the peace
which is being or has been committed in the
actors presence. Or, in preventing such other
from participating therein if (a) the other is
or the actor reasonably believes him to be
artici atin or about to artici ate in the
a ray. and b the confinement or force is not
intended or likely to cause death or serious
bodily harm and (c) the actor reasonably
believes that the force or confinement is necessary to prevent the other from participating
in the afray or other equally serious breach of
the peace." Restatement of Torts, Second
141.
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Under the Comment, the Restatement states as follows:
"Affect of actors mistake. In order
that the privilege may be available under
the rules stated in this section, it is
necessary that an afray or other breach of
the peace be about to be committed or have
been connnitted immediately before the
actor's presence. If this is the case, the
actor is privileged if he believes that the
other is participating or about to participate in the afray or breach of the peace and
his privilege is not destroyed by the fact
that his believe is mistaken provided the
mistake is not unreasonable."
Thus, the guilt or innocence of an arrestee is not the
pivotal element when one is protecting his own property or
The element to be proved in all cases involving ones own

person.

person or property is the reasonableness for the arrest by that
person, or his agent, i.e.; probable cause.
In further support of the above law is Cervantez vs. J.C.
Penneys, 595 F.2d 975 (1979) where in the California Supreme
Court explained Collyer vs. S.H. Kress & Company, supra, as
follows:
"At the time of the arrest in this case,
merchants were protected from civil liability
to false arrest or false imprisonment by a
common law privilege that permitted the
merchant to detain for a reasonable time and
in a reasonable manner for investigation any
person whom the merchant had probable cause to
believe had unlawfully taken or attempted
to take merchandise from the premises. The
rivile e to detain u on robable cause
esta is e in an e art to armonize the
individual right to liberty with the inherent
ri ht of an owner of ro ert to rotect his
interest in that property.
Emp asis a e )

was
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The above underlined language is the balance struck in
Collyer.

The inherent right of an owner to arrest or detain on

probable cause of theft of his property is justified because he
might be able to protect his interest.

The same is true as

it pertains to the person of the arrestor who with probable
cause believes that he must arrest in defense of his own person.
To again quote Collyer:
the law because the right to

or

Based on this common law privilege, Avondet had the right to
arrest, in protection of her person, on probable cause of assault.
The jury should have been so instructed and the court's failure
to· do so constituted reversable, prejudicial error.
In Bettolo vs. Safeway Stores, 54 P.2d 24 (1954 ), the
California court held as follows:
"The trial court instructed the jury that
it should disregard any evidence tending to
prove probable cause and that such defense was
not applicable in actions for false imprisonment where exemplary damages were not asked.
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The instruction was error and palpably prejudicial. Any person may make an arrest for
a misdemeanor committed in his presence.
Section 837 Pen. Code." (Emphasis added)
The Court's Instruction No. 11 in the case at bar was also
"error and palpably prejudicial."

The court instructed the jury

that "there is no statutory privilege protecting against an unlawful arrest for assault based on one having probable cause
to believe an arrest had been committed."

Section 77-13-4, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, specifically says "a private
person may arrest another for a public offense (assault) committed
or attempted in his presence" and both the authors of the Utah
Law Review and the courts of other states with similar statutes
have all concluded that an ·arrest can be lawfully made based on
"probable cause" or "where there are reasonable grounds to
believe" that such an offense (assault) has been connnitted.
Thus, there is in fact a statutory privilege for a private
person to arrest for assault and if the assault is cotmnitted or
attempted on the person making the arrest, such arrest is privileged
if the arresting person had probable cause or reasonable belief
that the offense of assault was being connnitted or attempted on
his person.

The jury should have been so instructed and the court's

failure to so instruct constituted an error at law and was palpably
prejudicial which made it impossible for Skaggs to get a fair trial
such that Skaggs is entitled to a new trial with proper

instruction~

POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE STANDARD OF
MALICE IN LAW LAID DOWN IN THE TERRY DECISION
AND ADOPT MALICE IN FACT INSTEAD OF MALICE
IN LAW.
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As a result of the Supreme Court holding in Terry vs.
Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314 Utah (1979), the court in its Instruction
No. 14 instructed the jury as follows:
"Before punitive damages may be awarded
you must find the issues in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant. In
cases of false arrest where the defendant
has not met its burden of establishing that
the arrest was liased upon probable cause
· the law im lies such malice as necessary
to justi y t e awar
punitive amages.
(Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court decision in Terry, supra, adopting mali·ce
in law instead of malice in fact, was connnented on by Ronald Boyce
in an article entitled "A Thumbnail Sketch of the Utah Supreme
Court Decisions, 1979-1980" published in the December 1981 issue
of the Utah Bar Journal as follows:
"The Court indicated that a private party
could be held liable for false arrest if,
~fter applying traditional standards of
probable cause, it was shown that there was
an abstance of an honest, subjective, probable
cause."
Boyce concluded as follows:
"In authorizing punitive damages on the
bases of malice in law rather than malice
in fact, the Court has taken the position
su orted
only a small minorit of
Juris ictions.
Emphasis added
In 1980, the Utah Law Review Volume 3, in an Article entitled

~'Developments

in Utah Law", on page 698, that part of the

Terry decision adopting malice in law instead of malice in fact,
is criticized as follows:
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"The questionable step in the court's
reasoning lay not in equating the absence
of probable cause with malice in law, but
in declaring malice in law sufficient to up~
hold a punitive damage award. While there is
some support for the proposition that a finding of malice in law will warrant punitive
damages, other courts have held that punitive
damages are only possible when there has been
a showing of malice in fact. Malice in fact,
or actual malice, is defined in a variety of
ways, most involving known falsity or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of
a charge. However, courts that require actual
malice to sustain a punitive damage award agreed
that actual malice involves an element of
active wrongdoing, not the mere absence of probable cause.
The actual malice rule creates three tiers of
liability. If the merchant has probable cause
to detain a patron, no liability arises. If the
merchant acts without probable cause, but in
good faith, liability arises only for compensatory damages. Liability for punitive damages,
however, would arise only when the merchant's
act is intentionally or reckless malicious.
The actual malice rule is preferrable for
several reasons. First, by limiting punitive
damages to egregious false imprisonments, the
rule better comports with the notion that
punitive damages are appropriate only for
aggravated torts. Second, the actual malice
rule allows for a fairer allocation of the
burden of proof. The Utah court was correct in
holding that the defendant must prove probable
cause; the plaintiff would otherwise face the
difficult task of proving a ~egative-the absence
of probably cause. However, it is both practical
and logical to place the burden of proving actual
malice on the plaintiff, and basic fairness demands that a party seeking to punish another
should bear the burden of proof. Moreover, the
actual malice rule is consistent with the apparent
intent of the Utah Legislature to give the merchant greater protection against the shoplifter.
Finally, the malice-in-law instruction implicitly
approved by the court may be difficult for jurors
to understand since they probably conceive of malice
1
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in the dictionary sense the malice in fact.
If the jury is told that lack of probable
cause establishes legal malice, conversely,
jurors may infer that probable cause is established merely by showing the absence of
actual malice. That inference would be clearly
erroneous. Moreover, an instruction that
punitive damages are allowed on a showing of
mere legal malce, an instruction apparently
countenanced by the court, may lead the jury
to believe that punitive damages are ~equired
whenever legal malice is established. That
would also be clearly erroneous. As has been
suggested, a jury properly following the law
as enunciated in Terry would be very likely
to reach a Draconian result when the merchant
has made a good-faith mistake. On the other
hand, some juries may be inclined to find
no cause of action in a good-faith mistake
situation if they misunderstand the instructions
and do not believe the merchant's conduct
warrants the imposition of a punishment. The
actual malice rule, then, may benefit some
plaintiffs by making it clear to the jury that
it may find a middle ground and award compensatory
damages only.
The very real problem of shoplifting pits
two important considerations against each otherthe right of the merchant to protect his inventory and the right of the citizen to be free
from unwarranted detention and accusation. The
common law rule of strict tort liability protected
the patron, but at the expense of the merchant's
property interest. On the other hand, absolute
immunity for the merchant would go too far in
allowing one private citizen the right to detain,
search and question another.
The plaintiff in Terry suffered damage, for
which she deserved compensation. However, by
sanctioning unrestricted punitive damages for
a good-faith mistake, the Terry court tipped
the balance too far in favor of the patron and
against the merchant. To remedy this imbalance,
the court or the legislature should adopt the
actual malice rule. It protects the interests
of both merchant and patron without opening the
door to unwarranted punitive damage recoveries."
Developments in Utah Law, 1980 Law Review at 698.
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Professor Prosser would agree that malice in fact is much
better law than malice in law:
" . . . Where any such element of bad intent
or wanton misconduct is lacking, an imprisonment is the result of a mere mistake either
as to the identity of the party or as to the
propriaty of the arrest or of the imprisonment,
punitive damages are denied." W. Prosser, Law
of Torts, p. 44 (4th Edition, 1971).
Likewise, malice in law instead of malice in fact is contary to the very purpose of the Utah Shoplifting statutes granting
a privilege
mistake''

~o

the shopowner which "leaves room for an honest

without the imposition of punitive damages.

This con-

clusion is supported by the author of an Annotation entitled
"Construction and Effect, in False Imprisonment Action, of Statute
Providing for The Detention of Shoplifters." where at 47 ALR 3d
1005~1006,

the author concludes that:
" . . . the fact that under the statute the
merchant can act upon reasonable grounds
(as the Utah statute does) leaves room
for honest mistake." (Emphasis added and
language in brackets added)

In light of the Court's Instructions in the case at bar,
Plaintiff's counsel argued to the jury that an honest belief
on the part of Avondet was not sufficient (R. 254) and that
"If you find that they (Skaggs) failed in
that burden (proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that McFarland was guilty of the
crime of assault was circumstances where a
private citizen has no privilege to arrest
for assault based on probable cause) then
the law implies malice and its' malice that
gives rise to the award of punitive damages."
(R. 233)
and further that
-30Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"You people ought to have the courage to
award a judgment that is significant enough
that those people (Skaggs) get a message,
so the next time around it isn't you or
me as it was Dr. McFarland on this particular
occasion." (R. 235-236).
The reference to "you", the jury, is a plea that the jury put
themselves in the shoes of McFarland, which is an obviously violation of the "golden rule'' that precludes such argument.
It is respectfully submitted that if one factual circumstances
exists which would not warrant punitive damages because of a good
faith honest mistake in making a false arrest that the Utah law
as it now stands implying malice in law whenever there is a false
arrest, notwithstanding the circumstances, that the Terry case,
adopting malice in law instead of malice in fact, is bad law
and should be over ruled.

The Terry case was a 3-2 decision written

by Justice Maughn, now deceased, in which Justice Wilkins, who is

no longer on the bench concurred, in which Justice Stewart concurred in result and in which Justice Hall dissented with respect
to the punitive damages and in which Justice Crockett, who is no
longer on the bench, concurred in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Hall.
CONCLUSION
Under the Court's

Inst~uctions

in the case at bar, it was

impossible for Skaggs to get a fair trial.
The Court improperly instructed the jury that Skaggs would
be guilty of falsely arresting Plaintiff for an assault even
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though Skaggs employee had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff
had committed an assault on her unless Defendant Skaggs could prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff had in fact connnitted the
crime of assault and that in order for Plaintiff to have been
guilty of the crime of assault, Defendant Skaggs had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff's acts which gave rise to
the assault, were done intentionally by which term is meant that
Plaintiff had a conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result, and that Plaintiff would have to
have been found guilty of the crime of assault in a criminal court.
Defendant Skaggs objected to the giving of such an instruction
in that it imposed a criminal burden on Defendant with regard to
an affirmative defense in a civil trial.
The Court also improperly instructed the jury that there
is no statutory privilege protecting against an unlawful arrest
for assault based on one having probable cause to believe an assault
had been committed.

The Defendant again objected to the court givini

this instruction since Utah does have a statutory privilege, to-wit:
Section 77-13-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, as do
many other states which interpret similar statutes as allowing
such arrest based on probable cause when the person making the
arrest is protecting his own person or property.
The Court instructed the jury that if they determined
Defendant's employee had falsely arrested Plaintiff that malice
would be implied, thus allowing for Plaintiff being awarded punitive damages against Defendant Skaggs Companies, Inc.

Defendant

again objecteq to the giving of this instruction on the basis that
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whether or not there was malice in connection with a false arrest,
thus allowing for punitive damages should not be implied in all
cases but determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances
of each case.
Because of the Terry case, where Utah adopted malice in
law instead of malice in fact, what the Utah Law Review predicted
would occur did occur in the case at bar, to wit, ''a jury properly
following the law as enunciated in Terry would be very likely to
reach a Draconian result when the merchant has made a good-faith
mistake."

However, if the jury had been properly instructed with

respect to Skaggs' burden of proof with regard to its affirmative
defenses, the jury never would have considered punitive damages.
Nevertheless, because the jury was improperly instructed with respect
to Skaggs' burden of proof on its affirmative defens·es, and after
having heard the arguments of counsel in which counsel for Plaintiff
violated the golden rule on many occasions in asking the jury
in effect to put themselves in the shoes of the Plaintiff and to
award a sufficient amount of punitive damages to make it hurt
Skaggs so that what Anita Avondet did to Plaintiff would not
happen to any of the jurors, returned a general verdict in favor
of Plaintiff and against Defendant Skaggs and awarding $10,000.00
in general damages and $25,000.00 in punitive damages.
It is respectively submitted that the Judgment entered in
favor of McFarland and against Skaggs pursuant to the jury verdict
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should be ·reversed and the case remanded to the district court
for a new trial in accordance with proper instructions as to
Skaggs burden of proof with respect to its affirmative defenses.
DATED this 12th day of July, 1982.
/

MORGAN, SCALLEY & DAVIS
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